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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE
FORFEITURES RESULTING FROM ASSIGNED COUNSEL'S
REFUSAL TO RAISE ISSUES ON APPEAL
INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus1 permits a court to order a custodian
detaining a person to produce that individual in order to determine
the legality of the detention.2 The exercise of habeas jurisdiction by a
federal court to assess the validity of a state court criminal conviction
1. As used in this Note, the writ of habeas corpus refers to the common-law writ
of habeas corpus ad subJiciendum, commonly known as the "Great Writ." See Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1976);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95
(1807); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *131; C. Wright, The Law of Federal
Courts § 53, at 331 n.8 (4th ed. 1983); Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of
Societal Change, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 337, 337 (1983). Many have commented on the
Great Writ's "extraordinary prestige." Noia, 372 U.S. at 399; see Isaac, 456 U.S. at
126 ("writ is a bulwark against convictions that violate 'fundamental fairness' ")
(quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring));
Noia, 372 U.S. at 441 ("Habeas corpus is one of the precious heritages of Anglo-
American civilization."); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939) ("there is no
higher duty than to maintain [the writ] unimpaired"); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 85, 95 (1868) (writ is "the best and only sufficent defence of personal free-
dom"); Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, 1923 A.C. 603, 609 ("the most
important writ known to the constitutional law of England. . ."); 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *129, ("the most celebrated writ in the English law").
2. C. Wright, supra note 1, § 53, at 330-31; L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies
§ 3, at 4-5 (1981); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) ("Vindication of due
process is precisely [the writ's] historic office."); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75, 80 (1807) (writ relieves prisoner "from illegal imprisonment"). The fundamental
principle underlying the writ is that government should be accountable for a person's
imprisonment. Thus, if the incarceration violates an individual's fundamental rights,
he is entitled to immediate release. Noia, 372 U.S. at 402; see Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95 (purpose was to provide "efficient means" for relief); Secretary
of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, 1923 A.C. 603, 609 (writ affords "a swift and
imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement"); 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *135 (court shall within 3 days determine legality of detention). But
see L. Yackle, supra, § 3, at 6 (in modern practice, immediate release does not always
occur).
The writ of habeas corpus traces its origins in United States jurisprudence to the
United States Constitution, art. I, § 9, cl. 2, and to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789). The Act did not extend federal habeas relief to persons
in state custody. Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845). This was done by
the Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). Today, the power of the
federal courts to issue the writ is found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1976 & Supp. V
1981). Section 2254(a) provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall
be entertained whenever the prisoner "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States." Id. § 2254(a).
The writ's scope has been a matter of judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court
has noted its "historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope
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creates a tension between two important principles: federal protection
of individual constitutional rights and maintenance of a proper sepa-
ration of authority between the state and federal judicial systems. 3
Although society has an interest in providing redress to an unjustly
incarcerated individual, liberal allowance of the writ interferes with
of the writ, even where the statutory language . . . has remained unchanged."
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); see Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411
U.S. 345, 349-50 (1973); Braden v. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484,
501 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Originally, the writ would issue only if the
court that ordered the detention of the prisoner lacked jurisdiction to do so. See, e.g.,
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 287 (1891); Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328, 330-31
(1885); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 193, 202 (1830). But see Noia, 372 U.S. at 413-14 (common-law habeas review
was not limited to cases in which the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction).
In 1942, the Court abandoned this jurisdictional requirement and extended the use
of the writ to cases in which the conviction was obtained "in disregard of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of
preserving his rights." Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942). Today, virtually
all federal constitutional claims raised by state prisoners are cognizable in federal
habeas corpus petitions. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485-87 (1953); see Sykes, 433
U.S. at 87 ("This rule of Brown v. Allen is in no way changed by our holding
today."); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 685 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("habeas lies to inquire into every constitutional defect"); Noia, 372 U.S. at 401-02
(function of writ is to provide "a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society
deems to be intolerable restraints"). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82
(1976) (fourth amendment challenges no longer cognizable in federal habeas pro-
ceeding if there has been a full and fair opportunity to raise them in state court).
In theory, the writ is not a collateral attack in which the prisoner seeks review of a
state court judgment. Rather, it is an independent civil suit brought by the defendant
against the official detaining him. E.g., Noia, 372 U.S. at 429-31; Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346-47 (1915)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); L. Yackle, supra, § 3, at 5. Accordingly, a federal court has
the power on a habeas petition to rehear evidence and retry the facts. Townsend, 372
U.S. at 312; see Brown, 344 U.S. at 460-61, 463-64.
For a historical analysis of the "Great Writ," see Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 463-99 (1963);
Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7
Utah L. Rev. 423, 426-40 (1961); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an
Abortive State Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1324-32 (1961). See generally
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038 (1970)
(exhaustive treatment of federal habeas corpus).
3. Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 634 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981); L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 70, at 298; see Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539,
550 (1981); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 115-16 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606-07 (1975); Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-65 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 431-32 (1963); Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 1982);
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts From
the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 801 (1981).
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the state's orderly administration of criminal procedure4 and increases
the workload of the already over-burdened federal courts.5 To protect
the autonomy of state judicial systems, state court decisions resting on
adequate foundations of state substantive law are often barred from
review in the federal courts." The area of greatest federal-state ten-
4. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 88-89 (1977); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-65 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445-46 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting); id. at 466-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Spurlark v.
Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-48
(1970); see also Bator, supra note 2 (although broad collateral review is necessary it
must be balanced by limits supporting the interest in finality).
5. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445-46 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); see, e.g.,
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[F]loods of
stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and
swell our own."); Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 1982) (danger
of courts "being flooded by unworthy postconviction motions every one of which
must be... painstakingly considered on the merits"); Bator, supra note 2, at 506
(availability of habeas review "must be assessed in light of the strains put on the
federal judicial system"). In 1982, 8,059 federal habeas petitions were filed by state
prisoners in United States district courts. This constituted an increase in filings of
approximately 700 % since 1961. Bureau of Statistics, United States Dep't of Justice,
Habeas Corpus-Federal Review of State Prisoner Petitions 2 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as DOJ Report].
6. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443, 446 (1965); see, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590, 630 (1875). The rationale for this doctrine is that a favorable decision
on a prisoner's federal claim would not alter a state judgment resting upon an
independent basis of state law. Any federal court resolution of the claim on direct
review, therefore, would be advisory and thus beyond the federal power. See Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429-30 (1963). The Court has reserved comment on whether the
adequate state ground doctrine as applied to state substantive or procedural law on
direct review is mandated by the Constitution or results from concepts of federalism.
See id. at 430 n.40. But cf. id. at 466 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (adequate state ground
doctrine is constitutionally mandated).
The adequate state ground doctrine clearly does not limit a federal habeas court's
power to review state decisions based on substantive or procedural law. See infra
note 34. For reasons of comity, however, a court sitting on habeas or direct review
will not review state court decisions resting on adequate foundations of state substan-
tive law. Noia, 372 U.S. at 431-32; see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81. Clearly, in cases in
which state substantive law is "patently evasive of or discriminatory against federal
rights," however, federal courts on habeas or direct review will hear the constitu-
tional claims. Noia, 372 U.S. at 432; see Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3016 (1983)
(Court examining whether state sentence of imprisonment constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (Court examining whether state death penalty
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment).
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sion, however, involves federal habeas review of constitutional claims
that the state courts declined to entertain on the merits because such
claims were not presented in the manner prescribed by state proce-
dural rules.7
In 1983, the Supreme Court held, in Jones v. Barnes,8 that indigent
defendants do not have a constitutional right to compel their court-
appointed counsel to raise every nonfrivolous issue they wish litigated
on appeal." Six Justices, however, expressly reserved decision on
whether an attorney's refusal to pursue such issues in the state appel-
late courts, despite the defendant's demand, will result in a forfeiture
of those issues as a basis for habeas corpus relief.' 0 Justice Blackmun
stated in his concurrence that although counsel's refusal to raise non-
frivolous issues in the state appellate courts did not violate the defend-
ant's right to effective assistance of counsel," it nevertheless should
not result in a forfeiture of the claims in a habeas corpus proceeding. 
12
Justices Brennan and Marshall argued in dissent that counsel's refusal
to raise the colorable claims on appeal violated the defendant's right
7. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1977); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 432 (1963); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 634 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1981); L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 71, at 299-300. This controversy
only exists as to federal habeas review of state procedural defaults. Clearly, the
adequate state grounds doctrine will bar federal relief for any defaults on direct
review in the state court, if that court has invoked a procedural default as the basis
for refusing to address the merits of defendant's constitutional claims. See id. §§ 71,
74, at 299, 305. See infra note 34.
Rejection of a constitutional claim on the merits by a state court, however, will not
prevent the federal court from giving relief. Accordingly, state court decisions deal-
ing on the merits with pure questions of federal constitutional law are not res
judicata. See, e.g., Noia, 372 U.S. at 421-22; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458
(1953); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309, 334 (1915).
8. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
9. Id. at 3314.
10. See id. at 3314 n.7; cf. Frazier v. Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 738 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court-appointed counsel's failure to raise claim in state court re-
sulted in forfeiture of the claim but "result might be different if petitioner had
vigorously opposed his counsel's decision of which issues to raise on appeal.").
11. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see U.S. Const.
amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides, in part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." This right has been incorporated by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to apply to the states. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
27 (1972); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337-38, 345
(1963). The right to assistance of counsel is interpreted to mean the right to effective
assistance of counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 58, 71 (1932).
12. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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to assistance of counsel 13 as well as his right of equal access to the
appellate courts. 14
This Note analyzes whether a court-appointed attorney's refusal to
pursue nonfrivolous issues in a state court' 5 appeal despite the indigent
prisoner's demand should result in a forfeiture of those claims in a
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding. This issue typically arises when
an indigent defendant is convicted in a state trial court, and thereafter
appeals the conviction with an assigned public defender or an ap-
pointed defense attorney. The defendant requests that the attorney
allege certain trial errors16 on appeal. '7 The attorney refuses to raise
the constitutional claims or put them in his brief,", and the state
appellate court affirms the conviction. Because of state procedural
rules that deem any issues that could have been raised but were not
briefed or argued on appeal to be waived,' no higher state court will
13. Id. at 3314-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 3315. The fourteenth amendment requires that if an appeal is available
to those who can pay for it, the state must afford an indigent adequate access to the
appellate process. Id. at 3312; see, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45
(1967) (state must appoint new counsel when old counsel withdraws from a nonfrivo-
Ious appeal); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (indigent has right
to appointed counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956)
(indigent entitled to free trial transcript or similar trial report).
15. This Note does not discuss 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which
affords federal postconviction review for federal prisoners.
16. Habeas petitioners typically claim that an improper instruction was given to
the jury or that unconstitutionally-seized evidence was admitted, improper testi-
mony was adduced or that there was prosecutorial misconduct. Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 92 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
17. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3310-11 (1983); Cunningham v.
Henderson, 725 F.2d 32, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1984); Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 177
(5th Cir. 1983); Cerbo v. Fauver, 616 F.2d 714, 717 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
858 (1980); Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 976 (1978); Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173, 175 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 957 (1976); High v. Rhay, 519 F.2d 109, 112 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States ex rel. Winters v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
18. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3310-11 (1983); Cunningham v.
Henderson, 725 F.2d 32, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1984); Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 177
(5th Cir. 1983); Cerbo v. Fauver, 616 F.2d 714, 717 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
858 (1980); Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 976 (1978); Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173, 175 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 957 (1976); High v. Rhay, 519 F.2d 109, 112 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States ex rel. Winters v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
19. See, e.g, Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 399 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia
law); Gray v. Greer, 707 F.2d 965, 967 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1983) (Illinois law); Holcomb
v. Murphy, 701 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir.) (Oklahoma law), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3546 (1983); Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 321 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (Hawaii law);
Hubbard v. Jeffes, 653 F.2d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania law); Forman v.
[Vol. 52
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hear the issues.20 If the conviction is affirmed on direct review in the
state's highest court, or leave to appeal to that court is denied, the
defendant petitions a federal court21 for a writ of habeas corpus. 22
The Supreme Court has developed two standards for determining
when a state procedural default 23 barring state court review also
results in a forfeiture of federal claims as a basis for habeas relief.
Under the first, a prisoner will not obtain habeas review of the claims
if the state proves that the defendant "deliberately by-passed" the
procedural rule. 24 The second, and stricter, standard allows habeas
Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 636 (2d Cir. 1980) (New York law), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981); Hargrave v. State, 396 So. 2d 1127, 1127-28 (Fla. 1981) (Florida law); State
v. LaGarde, 311 So. 2d 890, 891 (La. 1975) (Louisiana law); State v. Gilles, 279
Minn. 363, 365, 157 N.W.2d 64, 66 (1968) (Minnesota law); Petition of Meyers, 91
Wash. 2d 120, 122, 587 P.2d 532, 537 (1978) (Washington law), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 912 (1979); cf. Levine v. United States, 436 F.2d 641, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1970)
(barring federal prisoner's claim in a § 2255 proceeding for claims that could have
been raised on appeal).
20. See, e.g., Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1074 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173, 175 (9th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 957 (1976); United States ex rel. Winters v.
DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1484, 1487 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) permits the granting of the writ
by a district court, a judge of any circuit acting within his jurisdiction, and by the
Supreme Court or any Justice thereof. In practice, the application is usually made to
the district court. C. Wright, supra note 1, § 53, at 333. A higher court receiving an
application may transfer it to a lower court having jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981): see Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U.S. 219, 220 (1943).
22. Before an individual petitions the federal court, however, he must exhaust his
state remedies. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886); Stranghoener v. Black,
720 F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). The exhaustion requirement evolved as a doctrine of comity between
the federal and state courts and does not limit the jurisdiction or power of the federal
court to intercede. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-20 (1963); see Bowen v. Johnston,
306 U.S. 19, 23-27 (1939). The rationale for this doctrine is that "it would be
unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state
court conviction without an opportunity [for] the state courts to correct a constitu-
tional violation." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950), overruled in part, Noia,
372 U.S. at 435. The exhaustion requirement refers only to a failure to exhaust state
remedies still open at the time the prisoner files an application for habeas corpus in
the federal court. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 516 (1972); Noia, 372 U.S. at
434-35; see Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 272 n.3 (1971). The Court recently held
that when a habeas petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, it must
be dismissed until the unexhausted claims are either adjudicated by a court or
voluntarily waived by the defendant. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982).
For a thorough analysis of Rose v. Lundy and the exhaustion doctrine, see Yackle,
The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to
First Principles, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 393, 401-440 (1983).
23. A "procedural default" as used in this Note refers to a failure by the defend-
ant to comply with a state rule or statute governing criminal procedure.
24. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
review only when the prisoner shows good cause25 for, and prejudice"
resulting from, the procedural default. The Court has not determined
which standard will apply to procedural defaults, that barred state
court review of constitutional issues not raised on direct appeal.27
This Note analyzes the two standards and concludes that the stricter
standard should apply to situations involving forfeitures of constiti-
tional claims in state court resulting from assigned defense counsel's
failure to raise these claims on direct appeal. Further, the Note exam-
ines the circumstances under which a defendant whose attorney
refuses to raise demanded issues on appeal may satisfy this standard,
thereby allowing federal review of constitutional claims not consid-
ered at the state level.2 8
I. STANDARDS FOR DErERmINING THE AvAILABILITY OF FEDERAL HABEAs
REVIEw AFrER STATE Fo FEiTus
A. The Fay v. Noia Approach: "Deliberate By-pass"
In Fay v. Noia,2 9 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
when a state procedural default, that barred state court review of
constitutional issues will similarly result in the forfeiture of those
claims in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 30 A state prisoner who
failed to take a timely appeal of his conviction in state court l was
barred by the state courts from later appealing the conviction. 32 He
later sought habeas review of the state conviction in federal court on
the ground that his state court conviction had resulted from the
introduction of a coerced confession. 33 The Court ruled that the doc-
25. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
26. id.
27. See id. at 88 n.12; Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 638 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). See infra note 113. Professor Yackle commented
that the standard that federal habeas courts should apply when deciding whether to
review constitutional claims after forfeitures of those claims in state court "evades a
definitive answer which can guide the lower courts in what must be considered a
critical part of their postconviction work." L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 71, at 300.
28. This Note does not suggest that either standard is completely satisfactory but
rather examines the policy considerations underlying the standards and applies these
considerations to procedural defaults that barred state court review of constitutional
claims because of defense counsel's failure to raise issues on appeal. For criticisms of
these standards, see infra notes 48, 53, 58, 62, 67, 69.
29. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
30. See id. at 394.
31. Noia did not appeal because he feared that he might receive a death sentence
should he succeed on appeal and face a second trial. Id. at 440.
32. Id. at 394.
33. Id. at 395. Noia appealed in state court fifteen years later, after his co-
defendants were released because their confessions were coerced in violation of the
[Vol. 52
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trine under which state procedural defaults constitute an adequate
and independent state ground barring federal review does not limit
the power granted to the federal courts under the federal habeas
corpus statute.34
The Court advocated liberal availability of the writ to provide
remedies for persons illegally detained. 35 To facilitate liberal use, the
Court reasoned, state procedural rules should not lightly foreclose a
full opportunity for judicial review when federal constitutional rights
of personal liberty are in question. 36 As a matter of comity, however,
the Court acknowledged a "limited discretion in the federal judge to
deny relief . . . to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the
orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his
state court remedies. '" 37
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 396 n.3. The parties stipulated that Noia's confession
was coerced. Id. at 395-96 & n.2.
34. Id. at 399, 434. Noia partially overruled Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443(1953). In Brown, a consolidation of three lower court appeals, a federal habeas
court refused to review one of the state capital convictions after state courts refused
to consider an appeal because the appellate papers had been filed one day late. The
Court reasoned that it was without power to review the judgment because the state
decision rested on an adequate and independent state ground. Brown, 344 U.S. at
484-87. See supra notes 6-7. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Noia, reasoned
that the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine relates only to the federal
court's direct appellate jurisdiction and not to the original jurisdiction of a federal
habeas court. Noia, 372 U.S. at 429-30. Unlike an appellate court, a federal habeas
court does not review state court judgments per se, but rather, inquires indepen-
dently into the constitutional validity of the petitioner's detention. Id. at 430. If the
federal claim has merit, the appropriate relief is release. See supra note 2. In theory,
the state court judgment is unaffected, therefore, application of the adequate state
grounds doctrine is inappropriate. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 430. See supra note 2.
Justice Brennan stated that measured against the individual's interest in federal
consideration of federal claims, the state's interest in "an airtight system of forfeit-
ures" must give way. Noia, 372 U.S. at 432.
Justices Harlan and Clark in dissent wrote that the decision struck a "heavy blow
at the foundations of our federal system," id. at 449, reasoning that the federal courts
are constitutionally without power to release a prisoner whose conviction rests upon
adequate and independent state grounds. Id. at 448, 466. The dissenters argued that
the Court's decision would disrupt the effective administration of justice in state
courts by depriving state judgments of finality, id. at 446 (Clark, J., dissenting), and
by assuming full power to review matters of state procedure, id. at 466-67 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Justice Clark feared that the federal habeas petition would become a
functional equivalent of a state court appeal. See id. at 446 (Clark, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 405-06 ("[T]he constitution invites, if it does not compel.., a gener-
ous construction . . ."). The Court found that Congress, by providing a federal
forum for state prisoners in 1867, intended the writ to be issued liberally to redress
unjust incarceration. Id. at 426.
36. Id. at 424, 426-27, 433-34. See infra note 67.
37. Id. at 438. The Court reasoned that discretion is implicit in the language of
28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which commands the judge to "dispose of
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The majority made clear that to support a finding that the prisoner
deliberately by-passed the state court procedures, the waiver must be
"'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege. ' 38 Knowledge of the right and intent to abandon it are
examined from the defendant's viewpoint. 39 A choice made by counsel
without the defendant's knowledge will not necessarily bar relief.40
B. The Wainwright v. Sykes Approach: "Cause" and
"Actual Prejudice"
Fourteen years after Noia, the Court in Wainwright v. Sykes4 set
forth a more stringent standard for determining when habeas corpus
review should be granted following certain state procedural defaults.
The Court held that failure of a defense counsel to comply with a state
contemporaneous-objection rule42 would result in the forfeiture of
those objections in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless the
accused could show good cause43 for the procedural default and resul-
tant prejudice. 44
the matter as law and justice require," id., and also because habeas has been guided
by equitable principles, one being that a "suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at
hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks." Noia, 372 U.S. at 438.
38. Noia, 372 U.S. at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
39. Id.
40. Id.; see Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 517 (1972) (Court emphasizing
need to find personal participation of prisoner). Although the Court acknowledged
that Noia fully understood his right to appeal, it expressed sympathy with his "grisly
choice whether to sit content with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain
avenue of appeal which, if successful, might well have led to a retrial and death
sentence." Noia, 372 U.S. at 440. It has been argued that the "deliberate by-pass"
standard was never applied in this case, because Noia's action was in fact deliberate.
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95 n.3 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
41. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
42. State contemporaneous-objection rules provide that all objections not raised
at the time evidence is introduced are deemed waived. See, e.g., Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.190(i)(2) (West 1973); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 920 (West Supp. 1984);
Ohio R. Crim. P. 30(A) (Page Supp. 1982). Sykes involved Florida's criminal proce-
dure law, which required a pretrial motion to suppress an illegally-obtained confes-
sion or admission. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(i)(2) (West 1973). Sykes contended that
his conviction was tainted by the admission into evidence of a confession he had
made without understanding his Miranda rights. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74-75. Because
he failed to assert this claim at his trial or on direct appeal, the state habeas court
refused to hear the claim. See id. at 75.
43. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
44. Id. Sykes was not the first case in which the Court found that a claim could
be waived despite the absence of a considered choice by the defendant as required by
Noia. In Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), defense counsel failed to object at
the proper time to the introduction of allegedly illegally-seized evidence. Id. at 445-
46. After the state court refused to hear the claim, the case came to the Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari. Id. The Court remanded the case to the state court,
stating that if counsel did not object for strategic purposes it "would amount to a
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waiver binding on petitioner and would preclude him from a decision on the merits
of his federal claim either in the state courts or here." Id. at 451. One commentator
opined that Henry precipitated the dilution of Noia's requirement of personal partici-
pation by the prisoner for waiver. Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural
Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 341, 352 n.50
(1978).
The "cause and prejudice" test derives from Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233
(1973) and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). In Davis, a federal prisoner
attempted to raise a grand jury discrimination claim for the first time in a federal
collateral proceeding. 411 U.S.. at 234-36. He had not raised the claim before trial as
required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), which at that time provided that failure to
object to the makeup of the grand jury before trial constitutes a waiver of the
objection, but that "the court for cause shown [could] grant relief from the waiver."
Id. at 236. The Court applied this rule without examining the defendant's participa-
tion as required by Noia. Id. at 255-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Francis, the defendant failed to comply with a state statute that was similar to
Rule 12(b)(2). 425 U.S. at 537-38 & n.l. There was no "cause" or "prejudice"
provision. Id. at 537 n.1. Nevertheless, the Court extended Davis to state prisoners
and held that the defendant could have his claim litigated only upon a showing of
both "cause" for the failure to comply with the procedural rule, and "actual preju-
dice." Id. at 542. Thus, Sykes extended Davis and Francis beyond issues pertaining to
the initiation of criminal proceedings.
Finally, in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), a prisoner was denied permis-
sion by the jailer to wear street clothes at his state trial. Id. at 502. At trial, Williams'
attorney did not object when Williams appeared in prison clothes. Id. at 509-10. On
habeas review, Justice Burger acknowledged that a criminal defendant may not be
forced to stand trial in clothing that may be prejudicial. Id. at 504-05. Williams was
denied relief, however, because the state judge might have allowed him to stand trial
in civilian clothing if the issue had been raised and, therefore, there was no showing
of compulsion. Id. at 511-12. Curiously, as in Henry, Davis, and Francis, the Court
failed to distiguish Noia.
For a more complete look at the dilution of the "deliberate by-pass" standard prior
to Sykes, see Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 980-87
(1965); Rosenberg, supra, at 350-393; Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective
Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work To Do, 31 Stan. L. Rev.
1, 57-61 (1978).
Sykes is not applicable when failure to object does not violate a procedural rule.
E.g., Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 951 (1982); Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981); Freeman v. Georgia, 599 F.2d 65, 68-69 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672, 681 (5th
Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); see Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979)
("[I]f neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate that a federal constitu-
tional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no
disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim."). Furthermore, if the state decides
the federal constitutional question on the merits despite the failure to comply with
the contemporaneous-objection rule, habeas review of those questions is still avail-
able. See, e.g., Dobbert v. Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518, 1524 (11th Cir. 1983); Phillips
v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1188
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 740 (1983).
In addition, Sykes will not bar habeas relief unless the state procedural rule
constitutes an adequate state ground. See L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 79, at 318-19.
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The Court noted that a contemporaneous-objection rule preserves
trial integrity by forcing counsel to raise all issues at trial.45 The
majority asserted that the "deliberate by-pass" standard did not ac-
cord adequate deference to the states' procedural rules because it
would encourage "sandbagging" 46 by defense lawyers. 47 These law-
yers, it was argued, might choose not to raise constitutional claims in
a state trial, intending to preserve major claims for a federal habeas
corpus proceeding in the event their gamble on an acquittal in the
state proceeding does not succeed. 48
To meet this requirement the rule must serve a legitimate state interest. See Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 (1965).
The Sykes test was extended to federal prisoner's failures to comply with a district
court's contemporaneous-objection rule. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
167-68 (1982).
45. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90; see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-29 (1982);
Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 639 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981). The Court reasoned that not deferring to the contemporaneous-objection rule
would "detract from the perception of the trial ... as a decisive and portentous
event." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90. The Court wanted a standard that would make the
parties perceive the state trial as the" 'main event'.., rather than a 'tryout on the
road' for what will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing." Id.
46. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89.
47. Id.; see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 n.34 (1982); Hockenbury v.
Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981).
48. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977); see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 129 n.34 (1982). Because a defense attorney may make strategic decisions
without his client's knowledge, it is possible to be barred from federal review because
of "sandbagging" without having "deliberately by-passed" the state procedural rules.
Justice Brennan persuasively argued that an attorney does not have an incentive to
"sandbag":
[T]he defense lawyer would face two options: (1) He could elect to present
his constitutional claims to the state courts in a proper fashion. If the state
trial court is persuaded that a constitutional breach has occurred, the reme-
dies dictated by the Constitution would be imposed, the defense would be
bolstered, and the prosecution accordingly weakened, perhaps precluded
altogether. If the state court rejects the properly tendered claims, the de-
fense has lost nothing: Appellate review before the state courts and federal
habeas consideration are preserved. (2) He could elect to "sandbag." This
presumably means, first, that he would hold back the presentation of his
constitutional claim to the trial court, thereby increasing the likelihood of a
conviction since the prosecution would be able to present evidence that,
while arguably constitutionally deficient, may be highly prejudicial to the
defense. Second, he would thereby have forfeited all state review and
remedies with respect to these claims .... Third, to carry out his scheme,
he would now be compelled to deceive the federal habeas court and to
convince the judge that he did not "deliberately bypass" the state proce-
dures. If he loses on this gamble, all federal review would be barred, and his
"sandbagging" would have resulted in nothing but the forfeiture of all
judicial review of his client's claims. The Court, without substantiation,
apparently believes that a meaningful number of lawyers are induced into
option 2 by Fay. I do not. That belief simply offends common sense.
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The Court enunciated four reasons for a strict standard mandating
forfeiture of constitutional issues not raised at trial. First, such a
standard would encourage litigation of constitutional issues at trial
and thereby promote accuracy by enabling the trial court to develop
the factual record underlying the constitutional claim at a time when
witnesses are available and their memories are fresh. 49 Because the
passage of time leads to erosion of memory and dispersion of wit-
nesses, a retrial or an evidentiary hearing pursuant to a federal habeas
corpus proceeding years later may be less reliable or even impossible. 50
A liberal standard for availability of the writ, therefore, would often
lead to the outright release of the prisoner, thereby "cost[ing] society
the right to punish admitted offenders." 51 The stricter Sykes standard
further promotes accuracy because it allows the judge who observed
the demeanor of the witnesses to make the factual determinations
necessary for deciding constitutional issues.5 2
Second, the Court reasoned that as a matter of comity federal
courts should respect state rules of procedure. 53 Allowing these claims
to be heard in a habeas corpus proceeding would degrade the state
court system by depriving state trial judges of the opportunity to play
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 103 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Galtieri v. Wainwright,
582 F.2d 348, 367 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("Mesmerized by a
specter of its own creation, a litigious prisoner so diabolically clever that he may be
counted on to outwit state's attorneys and federal district judges, the court today
condemns real men of flesh and blood, untutored and unlettered in law, to years of
unconstitutional confinement."); see Isaac, 456 U.S. at 146 n.13 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
One commentator has noted that an attorney might "sandbag" if the constitutional
claim turns on disputed facts, the trial judge is thought to be hostile to the claim, and
counsel believes it would be more advantageous to make the first record on that issue
in front of a more symphathetic federal judge. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Proce-
dural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 507 n.180 (1978).
49. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88; see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982);
Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d. 634, 639 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 933 (1981); Friendly, supra note 4, at 147-48.
50. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982); Friendly, supra note 4, at 147.
Judge Friendly notes that it is unreasonable to expect police officers to remember
what warnings they gave a prisoner ten years prior, although the prisoner will claim
to remember well. Id. The average interval between state conviction and federal
habeas filing is 2.9 years. Almost one-third of these prisoners filed more than ten
years after conviction. DOJ Report, supra note 5, at 7.
51. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982); see Friendly, supra note 4, at 147.
52. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
53. Id.; Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 639 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981); see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128, 134 (1982).
Justice Brennan countered that sufficient deference is shown to the state by allow-
ing it to foreclose access to its courts on forfeited issues and that the state's interests do




an active role in the adjudication of constitutional issues. 4 As a result,
state appellate courts would be less stringent in enforcing their proce-
dural rules55 because they would perceive that constitutional issues
raised for the first time on appeal might be decided in any event by a
federal habeas court.5 6 This would leave state judges with the choice
of addressing the issue despite the petitioner's failure to raise the
claims at trial, or not addressing the issue and risking a federal habeas
decision on the question without state court guidance. 57 Similarly,
frequent federal intrusions undermine the morale of state judges, who
possess primary authority for enforcing the law, and thereby "dimin-
ish [their] fervor . . . to root out constitutional errors."5 ,, The Court
has noted that: "[T]here is 'nothing more subversive of a judge's sense
of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so
essential a part of the difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an
indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always
be called by someone else.' "59
Third, the Court reasoned that the stricter standard would promote
judicial efficiency.60 A trial concentrates society's resources by assem-
bling jurors, witnesses, prosecutors, defendants and judges.6' By en-
acting a standard that would force issues to be raised at trial, the trial
court could correct the claimed errors and thereby avoid further
expenditures of society's resources on costly retrials. 62
54. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-90; see United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d
354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) ("For a federal district court to examine this claim
now undermines the relationship between state and federal courts and only serves to
relegate the state courts to the status of second class citizens in the task of protecting
constitutional rights.").
55. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-90; see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982).
56. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89.
57. Id. at 89-90.
58. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n.33 (1982). Supreme Court Justice Sandra
D. O'Connor, while a judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, noted that the Justices
of the Supreme Court of Arizona were so frustrated by the extent of the exercise of
federal jurisdiction over prisoner complaints that they refused to hear any. O'Con-
nor, supra note 3, at 801. Justice Brennan argues, however, that the states' power is
still limited by the Constitution, and therefore, "[ilt is inimical to the principle of
federal constitutional supremacy to defer to state courts' 'frustration' at the require-
ments of federal constitutional law." Isaac, 456 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 128 n.33 (quoting Bator, supra note 2, at 451); see
Friendly, supra note 4, at 148-49.
60. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90; see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
61. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90; see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
62. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90; Friendly, supra note 4, at 148-49. Justice Brennan,
however, argues that society's interest in judicial efficency does not outweigh its
interest in preventing innocent persons from being unfairly convicted. See Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 146-48 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Fourth, the Court noted that a stricter standard of forfeiture would
contribute to the finality of criminal judgments.6 3 The state has an
interest in prompt enforcement of its judicial decrees.6 4 The Court
reasoned in a later case that, at some point, a prisoner must become
reconciled to conviction and focus on rehabilitation rather than on
endless appeals.65 The contemporaneous-objection rule contributes to
finality because it may lead to the exclusion of the allegedly unconsti-
tutionally-obtained evidence at trial. 6" Without this evidence, the jury
may either acquit the defendant and end the case, or convict him, and
leave him with one less claim to assert in a habeas petition.67
An unmentioned fifth reason for a more stringent test is the need to
reduce the burden on the federal courts created by liberal issuance of
the writ.68 This burden may be reduced by enforcing "gatekeeping
procedures."6 9
On the basis of these five policy considerations, the Sykes Court
enunciated the "cause and prejudice" standard, but declined to define
63. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-89; see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127, 134 (1982);
Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 639 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981).
64. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 446 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
65. Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 & n.32 (1982) (quoting Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); Bator, supra note 2, at 452;
see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982).
66. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
67. Id. at 88-89. Justice Brennan has stated that "conventional notions of finality
in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that
federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest
opportunity for plenary federal judicial review." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424
(1963).
68. The fear is that liberal allowance of the writ will flood the court with
frivolous applications, thereby prejudicing the occasional meritorious ones. Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("He who must search a
haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth
the search."); see Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 1982); Bator,
supra note 2, at 506. In a representative sample of federal habeas petitions, the
Department of Justice determined that only 1.8% of the petitions filed resulted in
release of the prisoner. DOJ Report, supra note 5, at 5.
69. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 1982). The Department
of Justice reports that the 700 % increase in filings from 1961 to 1970 "may reflect the
impact of court rulings that ... permitted Federal habeas corpus review of claims
foreclosed from state review by procedural limitations." DOJ Report, supra note 5,
at 2.
It has been argued that Sykes' concern with finality, judicial efficiency and reduc-
ing the federal courts' caseload is not furthered by the "cause and prejudice" test. The
result of this test is that petitioners simply assert ineffective assistance of counsel as
their "cause," thereby forcing the courts to review the merits of the habeas claim
because the underlying claim is relevant in determining whether counsel's failure to
raise it made him ineffective. See Tague, supra note 44, at 57-61; Comment, Federal
Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 981, 992 (1982). Recently, Justice O'Connor asserted: "Ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claims are becoming as much a part of state and federal habeas
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either "cause" or "prejudice." 70 Rather, the lower courts were left to
decide what constituted "cause" and "prejudice,"' 71 while keeping in
mind the petitioner's interest in redressing unjust incarceration, 72 the
state's interest in the orderly administration of justice, 73 society's inter-
est in federalism, 74 and the federal courts' interest in maintaining a
manageable caseload. 75 The Court noted only that, although the
"cause and prejudice" standard is narrower than the "deliberate by-
pass" standard,76 a prisoner will satisfy Sykes whenever a forfeiture
would result in a "miscarriage of justice. '77
corpus proceedings as the bailiffs' call to order in those courts." MeKaskle v. Vela,
104 S. Ct. 736, 738 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In
addition, the "prejudice" prong of the test forces the courts to examine the merits of
the case and, therefore, detracts from the goals of judicial efficiency and finality.
70. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
71. See id.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 45-67.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
76. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. It is possible for a defendant not to deliberately by-pass
the state procedures yet still not satisfy the "cause" prong of Sykes. E.g., Ford v.
Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 816 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (stating that application
of the Noia standard would leave the prisoner's claim open in habeas, while reliance
upon the Sykes formula would foreclose it from habeas review), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 201 (1983); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 638 (2d Cir. 1980) (same), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981). This is because Noia looks to the petitioner's knowledge
and intention concerning assertion of his claim whereas Sykes focuses on whether his
attorney has a justifiable reason for not asserting the claim. Forman, 633 F.2d at 638.
"In the absence of such a reason, the claim is deemed to be forfeited, regardless of
whether the petitioner ... consciously intended to waive a claim known to exist."
Id.
In addition, the burden is on the defendant to prove "cause!' and "prejudice," see,
e.g., Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1983); Runnels v. Hess, 713 F.2d
596, 598 (10th Cir. 1983); Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1981);
Mendiola v. Estelle, 635 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), whereas the
state bears the burden of proving a "deliberate by-pass," see, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963); Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States ex rel. Cruz v. LaVallee, 448 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). In Sykes, the Court found no "cause" because the
defendant offered "no explanation whatever for his failure to object at trial." Sykes,
433 U.S. at 91 (citation omitted).
Under the Noia standard, habeas examination of the merits was the rule. Refusal
to grant habeas review was justified only when the state could prove the applicant's
deliberate attempt to deprive the state of an opportunity to hear the claim. Under the
Sykes standard, federal courts will routinely decline to address the merits of federal
claims unless the petitioner can show good reason why the procedural default should
not foreclose federal review. Sykes can thus be understood as a mirror image of Noia.
L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 84, at 128 (Supp. 1984).
77. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91. The Court's narrowing of the scope of habeas review in
Sykes has been the subject of much commentary and criticism. See, e.g., Goodman &
Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30 Hastings L.J.
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1. Good Cause For Default
In light of Sykes' "sandbagging" fears, the lower federal courts'
interpretations of "cause" have focused on defense counsel's reasons
for failing to properly raise and present a constitutional question.
Most circuits have reasoned that an attorney's failure to assert a claim
due to neglect, ignorance or mistake constitutes "cause."'78 Attorney
errors of this sort cannot be deterred by enforcement of procedural
rules. 79 Some of these courts have not required the error to amount to
a violation of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel to warrant relief. 0 On the other hand, the majority of circuits
has reasoned that counsel's strategic decisions not to raise claims will
not constitute "cause '' 81 unless the prisoner can show that the attor-
ney's error amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
82
1683, 1689-1725 (1979), Rosenberg, supra note 44, at 397-448; Soloff, Litigation and
Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6
Hofstra L. Rev. 297, 318-32 (1978); Spritzer, supra note 48, at 497-514; Tague, supra
note 44, at 38-67.
78. See, e.g., Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 401, 403 (4th Cir. 1983); Gibson v.
Spalding, 665 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Washington v. Gibson, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673-74
(9th Cir. 1981); Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1981); Huffman
v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Goldman v. Ander-
son, 625 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1980) (dictum); Harris v. Spears, 606 F.2d 639, 644
(5th Cir. 1979); Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672, 683 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated on other
grounds, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981);
Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204 (6th Cir. 1978); Collins v. Auger, 577
F.2d 1107, 1110 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dictum), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979);
Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 511 (5th Cir. 1977). But cf. Tyler v. Phelps, 643
F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1981) (acknowledging that failure of attorney to object was
not a trial tactic but holding that "cause" prong not satisfied because counsel voiced
no explanation regarding his failure to object), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1992 (1982).
79. See Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1981).
80. See, e.g., Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 398, 401 (4th Cir. 1983); Gibson v.
Spalding, 665 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Washington v. Gibson, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1364
(10th Cir. 1981); Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1981); Jurek v.
Estelle, 593 F.2d 672, 683 n.19 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 623 F.2d
929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (5th Cir. 1981); Collins v.
Auger, 577 F.2d 1107, 1110 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dictum), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1133 (1979). But see Hutto, 724 F.2d at 405 (Hall, J., dissenting) (allowing attorney
error that falls short of a sixth amendment violation to constitute "cause" would
emasculate the contemporaneous-objection rule and the purposes of Sykes).
81. E.g., Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 400-01, 403 (4th Cir. 1983); Long v.
McKeen, 722 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1983); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 751
(8th Cir. 1982); Comer v. Parratt, 674 F.2d 734, 737 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 125 (1982); Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1981); Runnels v.
Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir. 1981); Goldman v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 135,
138 (6th Cir. 1980); Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443, 446 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 920 (1978); see Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 351 (5th
Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204 (6th Cir. 1978);
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By reserving decision on the "cause" issue8 3 after holding that coun-
sel's failure to raise requested claims did not violate the sixth amend-
ment,84 the Supreme Court in Jones v. Barnes left open two questions:
first, whether attorney conduct that does not amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel can constitute "cause"; second, whether a strate-
gic decision by counsel can constitute "cause."
A rule that attorney conduct must amount to ineffective counsel to
constitute "cause" is inconsistent with the policies underlying Sykes. If
such a rule existed, the flexible "cause and prejudice" standard would
serve no purpose because ineffective counsel would be an independent
reason to award relief and would make it irrelevant whether other
constitutional claims were forfeited. 5 In addition, such a rule would
force defendants to prove two constitutional violations in order to
receive a remedy for one.86 Sykes simply stated that "cause" would be
found when a forfeiture would result in a "miscarriage of justice. "87
There may be instances when an attorney's single act or omission
might unfairly prejudice his client's case without rendering the entire
defense ineffective.
8
Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618, 626 (2d Cir. 1978) (dictum), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 929 (1979); Collins v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107, 1110 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1978)
(dictum), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 511
(5th Cir. 1977); Rodriguez v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1096, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1976).
82. See, e.g., Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 401, 403 (4th Cir. 1983); Hines v.
Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1981); Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d
374, 378 (9th Cir. 1981). Ineffective counsel is often asserted as the defendant's
"cause." See supra note 69. If a prisoner proves that his counsel was ineffective, he
will most likely satisfy the "cause" prong. See Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876,
879-80 (5th Cir. 1978); Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1977).
83. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 n.7 (1983).
84. Id. at 3314.
85. Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting Jurek v. Estelle,
593 F.2d 672, 683 n.19 (5th Cir. 1979)), vacated on other grounds, 623 F.2d 929 (5th
Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); see L. Yackle, supra note 2,
§ 86, at 347-48.
86. Note, Attorney Error as "Cause" Under Wainwright v. Sykes: The Case for a
Reasonableness Standard After Washington v. Downes, 67 Va. L. Rev. 415, 425
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Attorney Error]; see L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 86, at 347-
48. Such a standard would require the defendant to prove a constitutional violation
that tainted his trial as well as ineffective counsel.
87. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
88. See, e.g., Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 398, 401 (4th Cir. 1983); Hines v.
Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1981); Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359,
1364 (10th Cir. 1981); Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672, 683 n.19 (5th Cir. 1979),
vacated on other grounds, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981); L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 86, at 348; Attorney Error, supra note
86, at 425.
The circuit courts hold that counsel's performance meets the sixth amendment
requirements if he performs with reasonable professional competence. See, e.g.,
Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Dyer v.
[Vol. 52
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Similarly, a rule that strategic decisions cannot amount to "cause"
under Sykes is unjustified. In most instances, when counsel does not
raise a claim for tactical purposes, he does so not because he wants to
preserve the claim for a possible habeas petition but because he be-
lieves raising the claim will hurt his client's case. 9 Nevertheless, once
the courts have determined that counsel was aware of a claim but
decided not to raise it, they inquire no further.90 Rather, some courts
simply reason that the attorney's reason for not raising the claim
"might" have been to save the claim for a habeas proceeding9' and
Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328-30 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d
1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Counsel's performance must be extremely incompetent
to fail under this standard. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 105 n.6 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]n light of the prevailing standards... for judging the competency of
trial counsel, . . . it is perfectly consistent for even a lawyer who commits a grievous
error-whether due to negligence or ignorance-to be deemed to have provided
competent representation.") (citation omitted). If the defendant asserts an unreason-
able strategic decision as the basis for an ineffectiveness claim, it is virtually impos-
sible for him to prevail. See, e.g., Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir.
1983); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 1982); Hubbard v. Jeffes, 653
F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1981); Drake v. Wyrick, 640 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Rhoads, 617 F.2d 1313, 1320-21 (8th Cir. 1980); Reynolds v. Mabry,
574 F.2d 978, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201
(D.C. Cir. 1973); L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 86, at 347.
89. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1968) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (attorney did not object to testimony by informant because even a success-
ful objection might cause jury to speculate on damaging character of the evidence
sought to be excluded); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965) (defense
counsel may have wanted to let officer testify in order to impeach him); Comer v.
Parratt, 674 F.2d 734, 736-37 (8th Cir.) (trial counsel did not challenge admissibility
of evidence because he erroneously believed that record contained other evidence
that independently corroborated victim's testimony), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 125
(1982); Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1981) (counsel preferred
to raise argument of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures in closing
argument rather than risk having objection overruled in front of jury); Hubbard v.
Jeffes, 653 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1981) (trial counsel did not object to prosecutor's
improper closing statements because he thought prosecutor "would become shrill and
alienate the jury"); Goldman v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1980) (attor-
ney did not object because he did not want to draw jury's attention to issue);
Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443, 446 (4th Cir.) (counsel did not object to
prosecution's closing argument for fear of prejudicing defendant), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 920 (1978).
90. See Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1983); Fowler v. Parratt,
682 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 1982); Comer v. Parratt, 674 F. 2d 734, 737 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 125 (1982); Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 378 (9th
Cir. 1981); Goldman v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1980).
91. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 514 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
("counsel's failure to object is in itself susceptible of interpretation as a tactical
choice"); Harris v. Spears, 606 F.2d 639, 644 (5th Cir. 1979) (asking whether there is
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therefore such failure does not constitute "cause." The Sykes Court,
however, arguably did not intend to bar habeas review of all strategic
decisions in situations when it is clear that no "sandbagging" problem
exists. 92 If in a given situation the courts are satisfied that "sandbag-
ging" was not intended, habeas review should not be foreclosed
merely because counsel's decision was strategic.
A recent Court decision indicates that it will be difficult for a
prisoner to satisfy the "cause" prong of the Sykes test. Engle v. Isaac9 3
is the only post-Sykes Supreme Court case discussing this requirement.
In Isaac, defense counsel failed to object to a jury instruction 4 because
he felt the objection would be futile in light of long-standing state case
law.95 After Isaac's conviction, a state appellate decision cast doubt on
the constitutionality of the instruction.9" Thereafter, Isaac filed a
habeas petition in federal court. 97 The Court held that the mere
any discernible advantage to failing to specify grounds for a new trial and whether it
can be presumed that no strategical advantage can be gained from failure to comply
with the procedural rule); Rosenberg, supra note 44, at 342 (courts ask "whether any
conceivable strategic or tactical advantage might accrue to defendants in general by
virtue of the particular type of procedural error that was committed in the state
court").
92. L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 86, at 349-50. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 91 (1977) (standard will prevent "miscarriage of justice").
93, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
94. The trial court instructed the jury that Isaac, who was charged with assault,
bore the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at
112. Ohio had a contemporaneous-objection rule. Id. at 115 & n.15.
95. Id. at 130. For over a century, the Ohio courts had required criminal
defendants to carry the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. See id. at 110. In 1974, a new criminal code was enacted stating: "Every
person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements of the offense is upon the
prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative
defense ... is upon the accused." 1971-72 Ohio Laws 1866, 1893 (codified as
amended at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (Page 1982)). For more than two
years after the statute was enacted, most Ohio courts assumed that this section did
not change Ohio's traditional burden-of-proof rules. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 111.
96. After Isaac's trial, the Ohio Supreme Court construed the statute to place
only the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, on the defendant. State
v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 110-13, 351 N.E.2d 88, 93-95 (1976). Once the
defendant produced some evidence of self-defense, the prosecution was forced to
disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
111 (1982). Later, in State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977),
the state court allowed Robinson to be applied retroactively if the instruction had
been properly objected to. Id. at 101-03, 364 N.E.2d. at 1358-59. Isaac's failure to
object to the instruction barred him from later asserting the claim in state court.
Isaac, 456 U.S. at 124-25 (1982).
97. Isaac asserted that because the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment requires the prosecution to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, and intent was an element of his crime, the prosecution had to prove lack of
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Isaac, 456 U.S. at 121-22. Isaac alleged
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futility of presenting an objection at trial cannot constitute "cause"
for a failure to object at trial."" The majority held further that the
novelty of a constitutional claim does not constitute "cause" when a
basis for the claim exists and other defense counsel perceived and
litigated the same issue. 99 The Court expounded on the "significant
costs"'100 that liberal use of the writ entails.' 0' In his dissent, Justice
Brennan commented: "The Court still refuses to say what 'cause' is:
And I predict that on the Court's present view it will prove easier for a
camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a state prisoner to
show 'cause.' "102
that it was impossible for him to know at the time of his trial that the due process
clause addressed his burden of proving an affirmative defense. Id. at 130. Addition-
ally, he contended that any objection to the self-defense instruction would have been
futile in light of Ohio case law. Id.
98. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 130. The Court stated:
If a defendant perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find
favor in the federal courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply
because he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state
court that has previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide,
upon reflection, that the contention is valid. Allowing criminal defendants
to deprive the state courts of this opportunity would contradict the princi-
ples supporting Sykes.
Id.
99. Id. at 131-34. "Cause" is not present where "the tools to construct" the
constitutional claim exist. Id. at 133. The Court found that the "tools" existed
because In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) which held that "the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged," id. at 364,
was decided almost five years before Isaacs first trial. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 131. The
majority commented that it "might hesitate to adopt a rule that would require trial
counsel ... to exercise extraordinary vision," id., but noted that many counsel had
relied on Winship in asserting these objections, id. at 131-32.
The Court later emphasized the conjunctive nature of the Sykes test and after
finding no "cause" held it unnecessary to decide the "prejudice" issue. Id. at 134
n.43; see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982); Hockenburry v. Sowders
III, 718 F.2d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1983); Runnels v. Hess, 713 F.2d 596, 599 (10th Cir.
1983). Isaac extended Sykes to cases in which the alleged constitutional error affects
the truth-finding function of the trial. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 129.
100. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 126.
101. Id. at 126-29.
102. Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Runnels v. Hess, 713 F.2d 596, 598
(10th Cir. 1983) (heavy burden on prisoner to unequivocally show good cause for
default after Isaac). Isaac has evoked much commentary and criticism. See, e.g.,
Note, Habeas Corpus: A Rule of Timing Evolves into a Doctrine of Forfeiture-The
Wainwright Cause and Actual Prejudice Test Remains Undefined-Engle v. Isaac,
26 How. L.J. 1269, 1284-87 (1983); Comment, "Fundamental Miscarriage of Jus-
tice": The Supreme Court's Version of the "Truly Needy" in Section 2254 Habeas
Corpus Proceedings, 20 San Diego L. Rev. 371, 393-97 (1983); Note, Habeas Cor-
pus-The Supreme Court Defines the Wainwright v. Sykes "Cause" and "Prejudice"
Standard, 19 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441, 460-69 (1983). For a thorough analysis of
Isaac, see L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 86, at 169-78 (Supp. 1984).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
2. Actual Prejudice Resulting From Default
The "prejudice" prong of the Sykes test focuses on the significance
of the evidence admitted as a result of the constitutional error. 10 3 The
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of "strong
uncontradicted evidence" of guilt, 10 4 and thus showing that errors at
his trial "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting
his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions."'' 0 5 To meet
this requirement, therefore, the petitioner must establish a colorable
claim of innocence.10 6
103. Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 642 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981); see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 172 (1982) (no prejudice found
in trial for second-degree murder because of "strong uncontradicted evidence of
malice in the record"); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91 (no actual prejudice found because other
evidence of guilt presented at trial was substantial); Harris v. Spears, 606 F.2d 639,
644 (5th Cir. 1979) ("prejudice" prong satisfied because entire case turned on hearsay
evidence that was not objected to); Collins v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (8th
Cir. 1978) (prejudice found because in context of entire record the only evidence of
guilt was admission of incriminating statements made by defendant to psychiatrist),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir.
1977) (prejudice found because introduction of two prior uncounseled convictions
was only evidence introduced). The "actual prejudice" prong also examines the
nature of the constitutional error and its relation to the reliablity of the evidence.
Forman, 633 F.2d at 642.
104. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 172 (1982). The Court appears to have
incorporated the harmless-error doctrine into its test for actual prejudice. See Sykes,
433 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under the traditional harmless-error
doctrine, the beneficiary of the error (the state) must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Under Sykes, however, the burden is on the
prisoner to show the absence of "uncontradicted evidence" of guilt. See Frady, 456
U.S. at 172; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91; Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1258
& n.25 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983);
Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 642 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981); Collins v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1133 (1979). The Court has imposed this stricter "prejudice" requirement for
petitioners on habeas review than is imposed on direct appeal because of the in-
creased finality problems inherent in collateral attacks on convictions. See Frady, 456
U.S. at 164.
105. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); accord Foster v. Strick-
land, 707 F.2d 1339, 1342 (l1th Cir. 1983); Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d
1243, 1258 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983).
Prejudice will not be presumed even if the alleged error infringes upon the truth-
finding function of the trial. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 171 (Court rejecting contention
that erroneous jury instruction on meaning of malice in first-degree murder convic-
tion is per se prejudicial and finding that defendant did not show "actual prejudice"
because other evidence of guilt was "overwhelming"). The Court has restricted this
definition of prejudice to alleged improper jury instructions while stating that "the
import of the term in other situations ... remains an open question." Id. at 168.
106. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 171 (1982). In Frady, the Court held
that the petitioner was not prejudiced by an improper jury instruction, but implied
that the result would have been different if he had brought forward "affirmative
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II. APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF FORFEITURES RESULTING
FROM FAILURE TO ASSERT CLAIMS ON DIRECT APPEAL
Sykes did not overrule Noia.0 7 The cases may be distinguished on
two grounds. First, Noia's decision whether to appeal was a funda-
mental decision reserved for the defendant, not his attorney.108 The
Noia standard, examining the defendant's personal knowledge and
intention concerning the assertion of the claim, is therefore appropri-
ate. The decision whether to assert specific constitutional objections,
however, generally does not involve a personal decision by the defend-
ant but is entrusted to his attorney. 0 9 It would therefore be unsound
to require a defendant's knowing and intelligent approval of these
decisions. 0
Second, Noia is inapplicable to errors alleged to have been commit-
ted during trial when the defendant's attorney is required to make on-
evidence indicating that he had been convicted wrongly of a crime of which he was
innocent." Id. The Court emphasized that Frady "never presented colorable evi-
dence" that would reduce his crime from murder to manslaughter. Id. For a thor-
ough discussion of judicial interpretations of the "actual prejudice" prong prior to
Frady, see Goodman & Sallett, supra note 77, at 1701-07; Hill, The Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1050, 1088-96 (1978).
107. Justice Rehhquist, speaking for the Sykes Court, stated: "It is the sweeping
language of Fay v. Noia, going far beyond the facts of the case eliciting it, which we
today reject." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87-88. The Court further stated: "We have no
occasion today to consider the Fay rule as applied to the facts there confronting the
Court." Id. at 88 n.12.
The circuit courts have continued to apply Noia when the defendant failed to
appeal his conviction. See, e.g., Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 115 (1982); Crick v. Smith, 650 F.2d 860, 867-68 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982); Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 284, 286 (3d Cir.
1978); Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873, 879 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Rinehart v.
Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). But see Sincox v. United
States, 571 F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1978) (court used "cause and prejudice" test for
failure to appeal).
108. Sykes, 433 U.Si at 92 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see Jones v. Barnes, 103 S.
Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983); 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-5.2 com-
mentary at 4.66-.67 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Standards].
109. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger,
C.J., concurring); see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345
(1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)); Jones v. Estelle, 722
F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 1983); Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1983);
Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976
(1978).
110. See United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 1973)
("A rule which would require the client's participation in every decision to object, or
not to object, to proferred evidence would make a shambles of orderly procedure.").
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the-spot decisions. I" The trial process does not allow for the "frequent
and protracted interruptions [that might result if the defendant was
required] to give knowing and intelligent approval to each of the
myriad tactical decisions [that are made] as a trial proceeds." '1 2
The Sykes Court left open the question of which test to apply when
a defendant's failure to raise issues at the appellate level results in a
procedural default barring state court review." 3 Lower courts' treat-
ment of the question has not been uniform." 4 Because the decision as
111. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). But
cf. Rosenberg, supra note 44, at 408 (decision whether to object to evidence should
not be a split-second decision because it should properly be made before trial).
112. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
113. The Court stated:
Whether the Francis rule should preclude federal habeas review of claims
not made in accordance with state procedure where the criminal defendant
has surrendered, other than for reasons of tactical advantage, the right to
have all of his claims of trial error considered by a state appellate court, we
leave for another day.
The Court in Fay stated its knowing-and-deliberate-waiver rule in lan-
guage which applied not only to the waiver of the right to appeal, but to
failures to raise individual substantive objections in the state trial. Then,
with a single sentence in a footnote, the Court swept aside all decisions of
this Court "to the extent that [they] may be read to suggest a standard of
discretion in federal habeas corpus proceedings different from what we lay
down today. We do not choose to paint with a similarly broad brush
here.
Id. at 88 n.12 (citation omitted) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 n.44
(1963)); see, e.g., Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir.) ("The Supreme
Court has not decided where the final line between Wainwright and Fay will be
drawn .. "), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); United States ex rel. Carbone v.
Manson, 447 F. Supp. 611, 619 (D. Conn. 1978) ("[fIt remains undecided which
procedural waivers will be evaluated under Fay's 'deliberate bypass' standard and
which under the narrower 'cause' and 'prejudice' test of Sykes."); Frazier v.
Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("In the wake of Wainwright, it
remains unclear which waivers are to be evaluated under the Fay 'deliberate bypass'
standard and which under the Francis test .. "). The Supreme Court recently
applied the "cause and prejudice" test in cases involving two procedural defaults: a
failure to object at trial, and a failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 112-13, 123 (1982); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 162,
167-68 (1982).
114. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 1982) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he lower federal courts have been unable to agree about the effect
of Wainwright v. Sykes" on Noia). A majority of the courts addressing the issue has
applied the "cause and prejudice" standard. See Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 399
& n.2 (4th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 360-61
(7th Cir. 1983) (en bane); Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 816-17 (l1th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 201 (1983); Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 321 &
n.3 (9th Cir. 1982); Gibson v. Spalding, 665 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Washington v. Gibson, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); Hubbard v.
Jeffes, 653 F.2d 99, 101 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) (dictum); Huffman v. Wainwright, 651
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to which issues to raise on appeal is typically entrusted to the attorney,
the Sykes standard arguably is correct. 115 Conversely, because the
attorney is not required to make a split-second trial decision, the Noia
standard requiring the defendant's approval of such a decision is
feasible."" Resolution of this issue will help the courts decide cases in
which an attorney refuses his client's request to iaise certain claims on
appeal. In this situation, the accused has not "deliberately by-passed"
the state procedures and therefore, under Noia, his claims may be
raised in a habeas petition." 7 Application of the stricter "cause and
prejudice" test,"8 however, will better further the policies identified
in Sykes.
F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 635, 640
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Evans v. Maggio, 557 F.2d 430,
433-34 (5th Cir. 1977); Ramsey v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 n.18 (N.D.
Ill. 1978); United States ex rel. Carbone v. Manson, 447 F. Supp. 611, 619 (D. Conn.
1978); Frazier v. Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 737-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); cf.
Spurlark, 699 F.2d at 363 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(applying Noia standard to reach same result as majority that applied Sykes stan-
dard).
Although most of the circuits apply the "cause and prejudice" test, they do so
without any significant discussion of why Sykes is preferred over Noia. Holcomb v.
Murphy, 701 F.2d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3546 (1983); see,
e.g., Matias, 683 F.2d at 349-50 n.3; Hubbard, 653 F.2d at 101 n.2; Huffiman, 651
F.2d at 350; Evans, 557 F.2d at 433-34.
A number of courts, however, has applied the "deliberate by-pass" standard. See
Holcomb, 701 F.2d at 1312; Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 129-30 (8th Cir.
1977); Maddux v. Rose, 483 F. Supp. 661, 665 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 627 F.2d 1091
(6th Cir. 1980). But see Holcomb, 701 F.2d at 1312 (Seth, C.J., concurring) (concur-
ring in result but applying Sykes test.)
One circuit has reserved comment on which test it will apply. See United States v.
Barnes, 610 F.2d 888, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
115. E.g., Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 606-07 (8th Cir. 1981); Harris v.
Spears, 606 F.2d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 1979); Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6
(8th Cir. 1977); Frazier v. Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 737-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
116. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 910 (7th Cir. 1982) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring); L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 84, at 339; see Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct.
3308, 3317 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that unlike a trial decision,
"[d]ecisions regarding which issues to press on appeal... can and should be made
more deliberately .... "); Harris v. Spears, 606 F.2d 639, 642-44 (5th Cir. 1979)
(accepting distinction between trial and appellate defaults but finds default excused
under Noia and Sykes); Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1977)
(embracing distinction but binding defendant to attorney's decision to omit issue on
appeal), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); cf. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
271 n.2 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (opining that counsel's ability to bind client
"should be limited narrowly to situations in which practical realities bar consulta-
tion, as often may happen during the course of the trial").
117. Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 957 (1976).
118. See supra note 76.
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First, a concern for accurate fact-finding"19 necessitates a stringent
requirement that discourages defense attorneys from saving issues for
federal habeas corpus consideration. 2 0 Because an individual must
exhaust state remedies before habeas review can be obtained,' 2' state
appellate review will occur more quickly after trial than will federal
habeas review. The accuracy of fact-finding at trial is not the primary
concern; transcripts from the original trial can partially substitute for
witnesses absent at retrial. 22 The accuracy concern, however, is ex-
tremely relevant to fact-finding on issues that were not developed at
the trial and that underlie the constitutional claim. 2 3 Because a state
appellate court's factual determinations made shortly after trial may
be presumed correct, 124 a state prisoner may not want to present a
claim to the appellate court, but "wait until memories have faded"'25
and present his claim years later in a federal habeas corpus petition. 2
119. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
120. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 816 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 201 (1983); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); see United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d
354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (adopting Forman analysis).
121. See supra note 22.
122. Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981).
123. Id.; see United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir.
1983) (en banc) (adopting Forman analysis). One judge noted, however, that the
accuracy consideration is not as relevant to appellate defaults because, unlike trial
defaults, the failure to object to the admitted evidence does not contribute to the
introduction of additional error. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 910 (7th Cir.
1982) (Cudahy, J., concurring). Similarly, Professor Yackle has suggested that if the
underlying federal claim "is purely legal... an appellate court is in just as good a
position to determine it, whether it was raised below or not." L. Yackle, supra note
2, § 83, at 121 (Supp. 1984). Thus, if the underlying claim is legal, application of the
Noia standard on federal habeas review would not prejudice the state. See id.; Cole
v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1070 (4th Cir.) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
124. See Marshal v. Lonberger, 103 S. Ct. 843, 850 (1983); Sumner v. Mata II,
455 U.S. 591, 591-93 (1982) (per curiam). The circumstances in which state courts
findings of facts are entitled to a presumption of correctness are listed in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
125. United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (en
banc).
126. Id.; see Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 816 (11th Cir.) (per curiam)
(standard prevents defense attorneys from omitting arguments in preparing appeals
with the intent of saving issues for federal habeas consideration), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 201 (1983); Gibson v. Spalding, 665 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1981) (same),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Washington v. Gibson, 456 U.S. 968 (1982). But
see Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 910 (7th Cir. 1982) (laches doctrine which
applies in habeas proceedings ensures that habeas relief will be denied when pris-
oner's delay in bringing his claim prejudices the state or government); L. Yackle,
supra note 2, § 83, at 122 (Supp. 1984) (same).
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In addition, forty-two percent of habeas petitioners assert ineffective
assistance of counsel as their federal habeas claim. 127 Such claims
cannot be easily adjudicated by resort to the cold trial record without
further fact-finding. It is important, therefore, to compel the defend-
ant to assert issues in a timely fashion so that witnesses can be located
and a record made. Asserting the claim on direct review allows the
state appellate court to remand the case for a prompt evidentiary
hearing or an adjudication on the merits.' 2 8
Second, considerations of comity 2 9 apply as forcefully to the ob-
servance of state appellate procedures as they do to those of state
trials.' 30 States have a strong interest in protecting both their appellate
and trial procedures from circumvention by federal courts.13' Applica-
tion of the "cause and prejudice" standard will decrease the possibility
that a federal court will decide constitutional issues without benefit of
the state courts' views, and will thereby encourage state appellate
courts to enforce strictly their procedural rules. 132
The third concern, promoting judicial efficiency, 33 is not applica-
ble to appellate defaults. The opportunity to resolve issues conclu-
sively and efficiently by submitting them to a jury has already passed.
Therefore, it makes no difference whether the trial outcome is re-
versed and a state appellate court or a federal habeas court orders a
retrial. 134
127. DOJ Report, supra note 5, at 6; see United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff,
699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc). See supra note 69.
128. Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
130. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 816 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 201 (1983); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); see United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d
354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (en bane); cf. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981)
(concerns of comity entitle factual decisions of appellate and trial courts to "pre-
sumption of correcftiess").
131. Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981); see United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th
Cir. 1983) (en banc).
The Court has stated:
[I]t is typically a judicial system's appellate courts which are by their nature
a litigant's most appropriate forum for the resolution of constitutional con-
tentions .... [W]e do not believe that a State's judicial system would be
fairly accorded the opportunity to resolve federal issues arising in its courts
if a federal district court were permitted to substitute itself for the State's
appellate courts.
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975).
132. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 816 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 201 (1983); Gibson v. Spalding, 665 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Washington v. Gibson, 456 U.S. 968 (1982).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
134. Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981); see L. Yackle, supra note 2, § 83, at 339.
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Fourth, finality in litigation 3 5 is promoted by a strict forfeiture rule
in appellate proceedings. 136 This rule is consistent with the Court's
wish that a prisoner who has had full opportunity to raise issues at
trial and on appeal be reconciled to his conviction. 37 Regarding the
finality and comity concerns the Court has commented that: "Our
trial and appellate procedures are not so unreliable that we may not
afford their completed operation any binding effect beyond the next
in a series of endless postconviction collateral attacks."' 38
Finally, the need for docket control 39 in the federal court system
calls for a strict standard to deter "piecemeal litigation.' 4' Less than
two percent of all habeas petitions result in release of the petitioner; 14
yet, unless a stricter screening standard is imposed, most applications
will be "painstakingly considered on the merits"'42 at a time when
federal courts are already "drowning in litigation.' ' 43
In addition to the policy considerations advanced in Sykes that
support the "cause and prejudice" standard, there is a practical reason
for applying the Sykes test to defaults resulting from attorney failures
to raise claims on appeal. The Noia standard arguably is appropriate
because the consultation required for these decisions would not inter-
rupt trials, and therefore, a claim should be forfeited only if the client
approved his attorney's failure to assert the claim.144 Because the
ultimate responsibility for strategic decisions rests with the attor-
ney, 145 however, application of the "deliberate by-pass" test to de-
faults resulting from failures to raise issues on appeal would make
state procedural rules easy to subvert. In most instances, the defend-
ant has little knowledge of what particular claims should be urged,
and usually leaves these decisions to his attorney. 146 If the Noia test
135. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
136. United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (en
bane).
137. See supra text accompanying note 65.
138. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164-65 (1982).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
140. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 1982).
141. See supra notes 5, 68.
142. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 1982).
143. Id. at 903. Applying the "cause and prejudice" standard to appellate defaults
would be a significant extension of Sykes because the Supreme Court has applied this
standard only in cases involving a trial procedural rule. See United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 153-54, 167 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110, 115 & n.15, 129
(1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 76-77, 87 (1977); Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S 536, 537 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 236-38, 245 (1973).
144. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
146. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) ("[e]ven the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law"); cf. Douglas
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applied, however, the defendant could litigate in federal court when-
ever an attorney failed to inform him of all the legal issues in the case
and then secure approval of counsel's decision not to press these
issues. 147
Furthermore, the Court has distinguished the failure to raise an
issue on appeal from the failure to appeal. 48 A criminal defendant has
a constitutional right to force an attorney to pursue a nonfrivolous
appeal. 49 There is no corresponding right, however, to compel an
attorney to raise nonfrivolous issues on appeal. 50 Application of the
Noia standard in this circumstance would therefore entail a metaphys-
ical inquiry into whether a defendant "deliberately by-passed" a right
he did not possess.' 51 Accordingly, application of different standards
in these differing situations is justified. Furthermore, in light of the
Court's recent decisions restricting the use of the writ, 52 it is doubtful
that it would revert to the liberal Noia standard. 53
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (emphasizing attorney's importance in "mar-
shalling" of arguments).
147. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95 n.2 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("The very reasons why counsel's participation is of such critical importance in
assuring a fair trial for the defendant.., make it inappropriate to require that his
tactical decisions always be personally approved, or even thoroughly understood, by
his client.") (citations omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 484
F.2d 740, 744-45 (7t:. Cir. 1973)).
148. Compare Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983) (attorney not re-
quired to raise all nonfrivolous issues on appeal) with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 744 (1967) (attorney may not withdraw from a nonfrivolous appeal).
149. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
150. See Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983).
151. Cf. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S 586, 587-88 (1982) (per curiam) (respon-
dent could not be deprived of effective assistance of counsel because he had no
constitutional right to counsel); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1974) (respon-
dent was not deprived of federal constitutional rights when state refused to provide
counsel for second appellate review, because such appellate review was discretionary
under state law).
152. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
153. One judge, however, has argued that Noia should apply because there is
Supreme Court precedent for its use. United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699
F.2d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 908 (1982) (Cudahy, J. concur-
ring). In Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), the Supreme Court applied
the "deliberate by-pass" test when failure by a federal prisoner to press an issue in
federal district court barred him from later raising the claim on direct appeal. Id. at
227 n.8. It is argued that because Sykes never overruled Noia, and Kaufman adopted
the Noia test for federal prisoners, Kaufman is still good law. Norris, 687 F.2d at 908-
09 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Kaufman, however, was written eight years before
Sykes, which explicitly left the issue open. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88 n. 12. Furthermore,
Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983), casts grave doubt on Kaufman's vitality. See
infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text. In addition, dictum in Barnes may
indicate that the Court has concluded that Sykes, rather than Noia, applies. See
1984]
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III. APPLICATION OF THE SYKES STANDARD TO FORFEITURES RESULTING
FROM ASSIGNED COUNSEL'S REFUSAL TO RAISE ISSUES
ON STATE COURT APPEAL
In Jones v. Barnes,154 David Barnes argued that assigned counsel's
refusal to raise all requested nonfrivolous claims deprived Barnes of
his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel' 55 and his four-
teenth amendment right of equal access to the appellate courts. 156
Respondent relied heavily on Anders v. California,15 7 in which the
Court held that an indigent defendant was deprived of his right to
assistance of counsel when his court-appointed attorney withdrew
from a nonfrivolous appeal. 158 The Court rejected these contentions
Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3314 n.7 ("We have no occasion to decide whether counsel's
refusal to raise requested claims would constitute 'cause' for a petitioner's default
within the meaning of Wainwright v. Sykes.") (emphasis added).
154. 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
155. Brief for Respondent at 12, Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983), reprinted
in 14 Petitions and Briefs, Criminal Law Series (BNA), no. 19, at 101, 122 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Criminal Law Series].
156. Brief for Respondent at 12, Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983), reprinted
in Criminal Law Series, supra note 155, at 101, 122. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that:
[A]ppointed counsel's unwillingness to present particular arguments at ap-
pellant's request functions not only to abridge defendant's right to counsel
on appeal, but also to limit the defendant's constitutional right of equal
access to the appellate process in order to redress asserted errors at trial-the
very right that an appointment of appellate counsel was designed to pre-
serve.
Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 433-34 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
157. 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see Brief for Respondent at 14-17, Jones v. Barnes, 103
S. Ct. 3308 (1983), reprinted in Criminal Law Series, supra note 155, at 124-27.
158. 386 U.S. at 743. In Anders, a court-appointed counsel concluded there was
no merit" to an appeal and withdrew from the case. Id. at 739. The defendant was
denied his request for another attorney. Id. at 740. After the appellate court affirmed
the conviction, defendant sought to reopen the case on the ground that he was
deprived of the assistance of counsel on his appeal. Id. A higher state court denied his
claim because the record showed the appeal to be "without merit." Id. at 740-41.
The Supreme Court held that the failure of the state to provide an indigent appellant
with services of counsel that would otherwise have been available to an appellant
with financial means violated the defendant's right to fair procedure and equal
protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 741, 744.
The Court stated that counsel's role as advocate requires him to "support his
client's appeal to the best of his ability." Id. at 744. The Court noted, however, that
if the claims were wholly frivolous, counsel may with the court's permission with-
draw from the suit. Id. If after full review the court finds any legal points arguable,
however, it must appoint counsel to argue the appeal. Id.
Barnes did not assert ineffectiveness of counsel as his claim but rather that he was
totally deprived of counsel on the particular issues he urged counsel to raise. See Brief
for Respondent at 12, Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983) ("Counsel's duty is not
measured against a standard of lawyer competence, but rather is founded on his
client's fundamental right to access to the courts."), reprinted in Criminal Law
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and reversed the Second Circuit, 15 holding that such a rule would
undermine counsel's ability to present his client's case in accord with
his professional evaluation 160 and would thereby "disserve the very
goal of vigorous and effective advocacy that underlies Anders."''
The majority reasoned that good appellate advocacy requires selec-
tivity among arguments,' 62 noting that "[l]egal contentions, like the
currency, depreciate through over-issue.' 16 3 The Court concluded
that Barnes was not deprived of counsel or access to the courts16 4
because counsel is most effective when he eliminates valid but weaker
arguments.'6 5 The Court recognized, however, that the accused re-
tains final authority to make certain basic decisions such as whether to
plead guilty, 1  waive a jury, 111 take an appeal, 168 or testify in his own
behalf.'6 9
The dissent argued that because the defendant must bear the conse-
quences of a conviction, the right to assistance of counsel is a personal
right of the defendant. 7 0 Accordingly, the defendant must be permit-
Series, supra note 155, at 122. It would be virtually impossible to prove that counsel's
overall performance was ineffective because of his strategic decision not to raise
certain issues. See Cerbo v. Fauver, 616 F.2d 714, 718-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 858 (1980). See supra note 88.
159. See supra note 156.
160. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312.
161. Id. at 3314.
162. Id. at 3312-13.
163. Id. at 3313 (quoting Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme
Court, 25 Temple L.Q. 115, 119 (1951)).
164. See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3313-14.
165. Id. at 3312-14.
166. Id. at 3312; see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., concurring); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969); Brookhart v.
Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966).
167. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312; see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
168. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312; Doyle v. United States, 721 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1983); see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1967); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
169. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312; see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1
(Burger, C.J., concurring). It is unclear why the decision whether to waive the right
to a jury trial and the decision whether to testify are ultimately decisions of the
accused. Both decisions are as integral to an attorney's formulation of trial strategy as
the decisions regarding which issues to raise on appeal. It is equally unclear why
these decisions are considered different from determining whether to seek a suppres-
sion of a confession. See Rosenberg, supra note 44, at 409.
170. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Faretta v. Califor-
nia, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975) (sixth amendment is a personal right of the accused
that protects more than states' interest in reliability of guilt determination resulting
from defendant presenting case in best manner possible).
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ted to disregard his attorney's advice regardless of its merit.17 1 A
defendant's right to proceed pro se, 172 it was argued, should not force
him either to forego the assistance of counsel or to relinquish control
over the entire case. 73 The dissent further argued that because de-
fendants are capable of making informed judgments about which
issues to appeal, 174 and because these judgments need not be made
quickly, as in a trial, there is no need to confer decisive authority on
the attorney.175 Justice Brennan commented that "to force a lawyer's
decisions on a defendant 'can only lead him to believe that the law
conspires against him.' ,176
Application of the circuit courts' interpretations of "cause"'177 to a
Barnes fact pattern creates a dilemma. On one hand, an attorney's
171. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). Faretta established that
the sixth amendment guarantees that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the
right to defend pro se when he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently elects to do
so. Id. at 835-36. After Faretta, it was argued that, because one has a constitutional
right to defend pro se and an independent constitutional right to assistance of
counsel, it is illogical to make a defendant relinquish one constitutional right to
preserve another. A defendant, therefore, should be entitled to conduct his own
defense and at the same time have the assistance of counsel. See Note, Assistance of
Counsel: A Right To Hybrid Representation, 57 B.U.L. Rev. 570, 579, 581-82, 583
(1977).
173. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3317-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The ABA Standards
state:
[W]hen, in the estimate of counsel, the decision of the client to take an
appeal, or the client's decision to press a particular contention on appeal, is
incorrect, [c]ounsel has the professional duty to give to the client fully and
forcefully an opinion concerning the case and its probable outcome. Coun-
sel's role, however, is to advise. The decision is made by the client.
ABA Standards, supra note 103, Standard 21-3.2 commentary at 21-42 (emphasis
added); see Model Code of Professional Responsibility Ethical Consideration 7-7
(1980) ("the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client" except for
decisions "not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights
of a client"); id. at Ethical Consideration 7-8 ("the lawyer should always remember
that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of
non-legal factors is ultimately for the client"). But cf. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 1.2(a) (1983) ("In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the
client's decision, . . . as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.") (emphasis added).
174. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 3317.
176. Id. at 3318. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)) (em-
phasis in original). Indigent defendants often view their counsel as acting in concert
with the prosecution and the court. In a recent study nearly one-half of the indigent
defendants represented by public defenders stated that they thought their attorney
was on the other side. J. Casper, Criminal Courts: The Defendant's Perspective iv
(1978) (abstract), reprinted in Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave, J. Israel, Basic Criminal
Procedure 90 (5th ed. 1980). Justice Brennan argued that the Barnes decision will
result in greater mistrust between the indigent and his attorney. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at
3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. See supra notes 78-82 and acompanying text.
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refusal to raise a requested claim is clearly a strategic decision that, in
a majority of circuits, does not constitute "cause."' 178 Binding an indi-
gent defendant to his attorney's refusal to raise issues on appeal,
however, presents certain problems. Unlike paying clients, the indi-
gent defendant neither employs nor selects the court-appointed attor-
ney,' 79 and hence the power of such a defendant to control his attor-
ney's litigation strategy is limited. The typical indigent defendant is
not consulted on strategic decisions, not informed of which issues will
be raised on appeal, and not advised on how the attorney is conduct-
ing the defense.'80 Accordingly, to bind an indigent defendant to a
court-appointed attorney's refusal to raise requested issues on appeal
and thereby deem any review of the federal claim to be waived is
arguably the sort of "miscarriage of justice" that the Sykes Court
sought to prevent.'8 ' Unless the accused has acquiesced in his attor-
ney's decision,' 8 2 the "cause" prong should therefore be satisfied.
178. See supra notes 81-82, 89-92 and accompanying text.
179. The prisoner may not choose his attorney. The court has relatively unbridled
discretion in determining which attorney will be assigned to the indigent. Drumgo v.
Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 933-34, 506 P.2d 1007, 1009, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 633,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973); Note, Client-Counsel Conflict Between an Indi-
gent Defendant and the Court-Appointed Attorney: A Procedural Analysis, 13
U.S.F.L. Rev. 177, 179 (1978); see Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1616-17 (1983)
(rejecting argument that sixth amendment guarantees a harmonious attorney-client
relationship); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir.) (right to counsel of
one's choice is not a sixth amendment right), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978);
United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir.) ("No defendant has an
absolute right to any particular counsel."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
180. See Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon And Argersinger, 64 Geo. L.J. 811, 815
(1976). Because of limited funding, public defenders' offices are often understaffed,
resulting in a high volume of cases. Id. Consequently the public defender may spend
relatively little time on each case. Over 60% of the defendants in a recent study
reported that their attorney had spent less than one-half hour with them; almost 30 %
reported that the attorney spent less than ten minutes. See J. Casper, Criminal
Courts: The Defendant's Perspective iv (1978) (abstract), reprinted in Y. Kamisar,
W. LaFave, & J. Israel, supra note 176 at 90.
181. See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3315 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[W]ith regard
to issues involving the allocation of authority between lawyer and client, courts may
well take account of paying clients' ability to specify ... what degree of control they
wish to exercise, and to avoid attorneys unwilling to accept client direction."); cf.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) ("There is lacking that equality
demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of
right, enjoys the benefit[s] of [counsel]... while the indigent, already burdened by a
preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for
himself."); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) ("There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.").
182. See infra text accompanying notes 183-86.
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A. Satisfying the "Cause" Requirement: Safeguards to Prevent Cir-
cumvention of Sykes
An accused who initially requests his attorney to raise issues on
appeal but later acquiesces in his counsel's decision not to argue or
brief the issues should be estopped from later asserting that the attor-
ney's refusal to raise such claims constitutes good cause for the de-
fault.18 3 An objective measure is needed to determine when a defend-
ant has acquiesced in his counsel's decision in order to prevent
circumvention of Sykes every time a defendant is convicted and later
seeks habeas relief insisting that he demanded that his attorney raise
these issues.
Whenever a disagreement occurs in the Barnes context, the indigent
defendant's "acquiescence" vel non in the attorney's advice should
depend upon the indigent defendant's awareness of his right to seek a
change of counsel, and given this awareness, his conduct in asserting
this right. In all cases involving such disagreements, the attorney
should be required to advise the defendant of his right to seek a change
of attorney. If the attorney fails to inform the defendant of this right,
and the defendant is unaware of this option, the "cause" prong should
be deemed met.18 4 The prisoner should bear the burden of proving not
only the existence of a good faith dispute, but also his ignorance of the
right to replace his attorney. This would be consistent with the Sykes
requirement that the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove
good cause for any default. 185 If a defendant attempts to substitute
counsel, but is denied this request, the "cause" prong likewise should
be satisfied.8 8 In cases in which the defendant is led to believe that
counsel will raise the claims or brief the issues and later discovers that
183. Even under the Noia test, a strategic choice made by counsel with the
defendant's participation would be a "deliberate by-pass" of the state procedures
and, therefore, would bar the defendant from habeas review. See supra text accom-
panying notes 39-40.
184. Cf. Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 260 (1967) (per curiam) (indigent's
failure to request appointment of counsel is not necessarily a waiver of right to
counsel); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) (same).
185. See supra note 76.
186. In this situation, the defendant has done everything he could to have the
claim presented at trial. This accords with the goals of Sykes. See supra text accom-
panying notes 46-48.
It has generally been difficult for a defendant to change attorneys simply because
of disagreements over which issues to raise. See, e.g., United States v. Zylstra, 713
F.2d 1332, 1338 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 403 (1983); Ennis v. LeFevre,
560 F.2d 1072, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); High v. Rhay,
519 F.2d 109, 112 (1975). Some courts require the defendant to prove counsel's
ineffectiveness before they will grant a request for a new attorney. See People v.
Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 123, 465 P.2d 44, 47, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 159 (1970); People
v. Molina, 74 Cal. App. 3d 544, 548-49, 141 Cal. Rptr. 533, 536 (1977).
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the claims are not raised, 8 7 the defendant cannot be faulted for not
seeking to change attorneys earlier, and thus the "cause" requirement
should be met.
Failure of an indigent defendant to submit a pro se brief or properly
assert claims in his brief should not automatically bar him from
having his claims heard on habeas review. Issues must be clearly
presented in a brief in order to be considered by the court and thereby
preserved for a future appeal. 1 8 Although an indigent defendant may
have the ability to spot nonfrivolous issues, it is unduly harsh to
require him to have the writing skills necessary to promote consider-
ation of his claims by an appellate court.189
Furthermore, the policy considerations in Sykes' 90 do not support a
forfeiture in this situation. Although the attorney's decision not to
raise the claims is a strategic one, any "sandbagging" problem is
mitigated because the defendant, by demanding that his attorney
raise the issues, and requesting a change of attorney, will have done
everything possible to avoid a procedural default.
Likewise, comity concerns militate against imposition of a forfeit-
ure in this situation. It is inequitable to base foreclosure of habeas
review on comity grounds in cases in which the state refuses to assign
another attorney despite the existence of a good faith dispute.
Furthermore, applying a forfeiture here will not contribute to the
finality of litigation because it will simply encourage attorneys to
advise their clients to include every conceivable claim in their
briefs.19' Moreover, allowing these claims to be heard in the few
situations in which a defendant seeks to participate in his case, along
187. See Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 176 n.7 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant
claiming he could not have made his request to dismiss counsel prior to trial date
because he had been incarcerated and had not learned of his attorney's trial strategy
until the day of his trial).
188. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); Mattes v. Gagnon, 700
F.2d 1096, 1098 n.1 (7th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d
354, 356-57 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Toney v. Franzen, 687 F.2d 1016, 1022 (7th
Cir. 1982); Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 282 (2d Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Metz, 609
F.2d 1052, 1054 (2d Cir. 1979).
189. See United States ex rel. Winters v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1484, 1487
(N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[A]s with many pro se briefs, Winters' was not precise in delineat-
ing the discrete issues it sought to argue."); cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932) (emphasizing need for counsel's aid "at every step"). In addition, the state
appellate court may refuse to accept a supplementary brief. Unless the prisoner fires
the attorney and defends pro se, it is in the court's discretion whether to accept his
brief. See Brief for Respondent at 29 n.27, Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983),
reprinted in Criminal Law Series, supra note 155, at 139.
190. See supra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
191. Cf. Ross v. Reed, 704 F.2d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that too stringent
a "cause" requirement would discourge lawyers from limiting the number of argu-
ments), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 523 (1984).
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with requiring him to prove resultant actual prejudice, 192 will not
greatly increase the burden on federal courts.
Defendants are bound by their attorneys' tactical decisions except
when the circumstances surrounding the decision are "exceptional. '193
The situation in which an indigent defendant urges his court-ap-
pointed attorney to raise claims on appeal and later is denied his
request to change attorneys despite a good faith conflict is an "excep-
tional" circumstance that should constitute good cause for any result-
ing procedural default. If the "prejudice" requirement of Sykes is also
satisfied, the claim should be heard on the merits.
B. "Actual Prejudice"- Substantial Errors That Taint the Trial
When an attorney refuses to raise issues on appeal despite defend-
ant's request, the "prejudice" requirement of Sykes should be satisfied
if the claims sought to be introduced are substantial 94 and as a result
the failure to raise the claims taints the defendant's "entire trial with
error of constitutional dimensions."' ' A claim would not be consid-
ered substantial enough to entitle the defendant to review if there is
strong independent evidence against the accused.196 If a major part of
the prosecution's case relies upon the invalidity of the asserted claims,
however, they should be considered substantial, and therefore, entitle
the defendant to review on the merits. 197
192. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97.
193. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965); see Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1965) (court refused to bind defendant to counsel's virtual surrender in
court); Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496, 502-03 (5th Cir.) (court declined to find a
"deliberate by-pass" when counsel failed to object to jury selection for fear that such
challenge would have adverse impact on counsel and would provoke social pressures
upon defendant and counsel), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
194. One court, recently hinted that, despite Barnes, if the requested claims are
substantial rather than " 'weaker arguments' winnowed out by appellate counsel in
the exercise of professional judgment," counsel's performance may amount to ineffec-
tive counsel. United States ex rel. Winters v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1484, 1489
(N.D. Ill. 1983), citing Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3311-13 (1983); see Ennis v.
LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1077 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concurring) (if issue is
serious it may not be left entirely to lawyer's discretion whether to raise claim), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978). Most courts, however, do not inquire into the substanti-
ality of the claim but simply state that the sixth amendment does not protect against
strategic decisions of counsel. See Cunningham v. Henderson, 725 F.2d 32, 36 (2d
Cir. 1984); United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 403 (1983); Cerbo v. Fauver, 616 F.2d 714, 718-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 858 (1980); Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 976 (1978). In light of the virtual impossibility of counsel's strategic deci-
sions amounting to ineffective counsel, see supra note 88, it is possible for an attorney
to refuse to raise a substantial claim and still not be considered "ineffective."
195. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
196. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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Although the defendant should be required to show that his claims
are substantial, he should not be required to prove his innocence in the
habeas petition. Recent Supreme Court interpretations of the "preju-
dice" requirement imply that a federal judge should examine a habeas
petition for "affirmative evidence indicating that [the defendant] had
been convicted wrongly of a crime of which [the defendant] was
innocent."'' 18 This standard would force the judge at the threshold
stage to make essentially the same inquiry as is made when reviewing
the petition on its merits. 9" Nevertheless, determinations of "preju-
dice" should remain a threshold inquiry rather than a ruling on the
merits. A habeas petition is not a substitute for a retrial. Once the
defendant shows the requisite "cause" and substantiality of his claims,
the courts should remand the case for a retrial, rather than determine
guilt.
In Isaac, Justice O'Connor speaking for the Court stated: " 'Cause'
and 'actual prejudice' are not rigid concepts; they take their meaning
from the principles of comity and finality .... In appropriate cases
those principles must yield to the imperative of a fundamentally
unjust incarceration. '20 If habeas corpus is to remain "one of the
precious heritages of Anglo-American civilization,"' 20 ' then the refusal
by an assigned counsel to raise a substantial claim in his client's appeal
must be an "appropriate case" for a federal habeas court to hear the
claims and thereby prevent a "miscarriage of justice."'202
CONCLUSION
Application of the "cause and prejudice" standard is appropriate for
determining the availability of federal habeas corpus review of consti-
tutional claims that state appellate courts refused to consider due to
counsel's failure to raise these claims on direct appeal. This standard
preserves the integrity of the state appellate courts by promoting
accuracy of fact-finding and enhancing the state's interest in the
finality of its convictions. In addition, it maintains the autonomy of
the state judicial systems and the principles of federalism while still
providing the accused with the opportunity to redress unjust incarcer-
ation.
198. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 171 (1983); see Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
199. See Runnels v. Hess, 713 F.2d 596, 600 (10th Cir. 1983) (Logan, J., dissent-
ing) (interpreting majority's reading of Frady as requiring prisoner to prove his
innocence on habeas petition to satisfy "prejudice" prong of Sykes).
200. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982).
201. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
202. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
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If a defendant insists that his court-appointed attorney raise claims
or brief issues on appeal and the attorney refuses, the "cause" prong of
the test should be satisfied unless the indigent defendant has acqui-
esced in his attorney's advice that the claims not be raised. If the
claims raise a substantial constitutional issue that taints the defend-
ant's trial, the "prejudice" requirement should likewise be met
thereby allowing the prisoner to raise such claims in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding.
Bradley Jay Butwin
